|
Brazil Defense Expenditures
Data on Brazil's military expenditures need to be approached with
caution. Their accuracy is complicated by high rates of inflation
since the late 1950s, by secrecy surrounding the funding of various
military-related projects, by personnel costs that are sometimes
hidden in other budgets, and by the common practice of mixing the
accounts of the national treasury, the Central Bank, and the Bank
of Brazil (Banco do Brasil--BB). However, even if the figures generally
attributed to Brazilian defense expenditures understate their true
value, there is consensus that Brazil is among the countries with
the lowest levels of military expenditures, and that those levels
have declined in the last three decades. For example, the rate of
military expenditures in relation to GDP has dropped steadily: in
the 1960s, it averaged 2 percent; in the 1970s, 1.5 percent; in
the 1980s, 1 percent; and in the early 1990s, less than 0.5 percent.
In 1993 that rate reached a mere 0.3 percent. Brazil in 1993 ranked
133d out of 166 countries in military expenditures as a share of
government expenditures. Within South America, only Guyana and Suriname
ranked lower.
Political scientist Paulo S. Wrobel notes that these data point
to a correlation between the type of government (military or civilian)
and military expenditures. That correlation is made even clearer
if one examines military expenditures as a share of the federal
budget: in 1970 that figure was 20 percent; in 1993 it was only
1.3 percent (see table 28, Appendix). The 1993 figure was the lowest
since independence in 1822. The highest figure was in 1864 and 1865,
at the early stages of the Paraguayan War, when defense expenditures
accounted for 49.6 percent of all government expenditures.
Brazil's low level of military expenditures can be attributed to
the perception that the country has few external threats and to
Brazil's large size in relation to its neighbors. In terms of threats,
the deepening integration process with Argentina since the early
1980s virtually has removed the only potential external threat to
Brazil.
Despite its low rate of military expenditures, in absolute terms
Brazil is by far the largest military power in Latin America. In
1993 it ranked nineteenth among 166 countries in total military
expenditures; the next highest in Latin America was Argentina, which
ranked twenty-fourth. From 1988 through 1993, Brazil's military
expenditures totaled US$43.12 billion (in constant 1993 dollars;
an average of US$7.19 billion per year). They totaled US$10.6 billion
in 1996. The defense budget in 1997 totaled US$12 billion.
The armed forces have had some minor triumphs on budget issues.
In early 1994, the Franco administration announced that it would
cut US$22 billion in the federal budget, dividing the cuts equally
across ministries. The military ministers reacted quickly, going
directly to the president to criticize the proposed reductions.
They succeeded in lowering the proposed military cuts by at least
US$300 million.
In late 1993 and early 1994, the armed forces were more vocal in
their criticism of the low levels of military expenditures. They
pointed out, for example, that the air force work week began on
Monday afternoon, after lunch, and ended at Friday noon, before
lunch, in order to save on the cost of feeding the officers and
troops.
Military salaries were raised substantially in mid-1991 and in
April 1992. According to one report, before the second raise, a
four-star general with forty years in the service was earning about
US$1,700 a month, and many soldiers earned only a few hundred dollars
a month. In contrast, a congressional deputy earned more than US$6,000
a month.
The armed forces have been trying to protect their priority projects:
the army--Calha Norte and the "defense" of the Amazon;
the navy--its nuclear-powered submarine; the air force--its AMX
subsonic fighter. Each project has had special funding from the
federal government, aside from the general military budget. Additional
funding has sometimes been available through various government
agencies.
In essence, the armed forces are being squeezed in an unintended
fashion by a neoliberal economic model that stresses cuts in government
expenditures and privatizations. Not only has their budget been
cut, but they no longer have the ready-made sinecure of state enterprises
in which to work at the time of retirement. Indeed, under the military
regime, state enterprises became bloated with retired military officers.
A 1983 study by political scientist Walder de Góes identified
more than 8,000 retired officers who were in positions within the
state enterprises and federal bureaucracy.
What the defense spending levels suggest is that the military is
having to compete with virtually every civilian ministry and, in
many cases, is coming up short. Moreover, even though the military
is still the most influential player on some issues, the number
of civilian actors involved in the decision-making process has increased.
In many cases, the military has been displaced by civilians. The
Ministry of Finance has become the dominant actor on budget issues.
Although the armed forces can try to appeal directly to the president,
such an approach is not guaranteed to succeed. Also, the armed forces
must deal directly with a Congress responsible for approving the
budget.
Data as of April 1997
|
|
